The meaning of a word is its use in the language.-Wittgenstein
circulate within the self-referential framework of the discursivdlinguistic traditions of the West and often have the effect of reinforcing, rather than disrupting, the system of knowledge that is being brought under critical examination. What I mean is that theories that invest so heavily in selfcontemplation on behalf of metropolitan European languages cannot but replicate Eurocentrism in the act of criticizing it. After all, attacks on European culture from some hallucinatory non-European perspective in the West have always been a dynamic part of the European intellectual tradition since the time of the Enlightenment, if not earlier. My point here is not to seek some authentic non-Euro-American position, which would have to be constructed against its Euro-American opposite, hence forfeiting any claim of authenticity; nor do I wish to concern myself with the need to raise the voice of the Third World-Where is the Third World? Who names it? And who represents it anyway? Instead, I would like to raise the possibility of rethinking the condition of contemporary theory in terms of contestation of languages, by which I mean national, ethnic, and regional languages and dialects in a literal sense rather than the Saussurian langue versus parole or Bakhtin's notion of heteroglossia.* Inasmuch as theory, like other discursive practices, is linguistically specific as well as context-bound, I see the relationship between languages as one of the central issues that it is incumbent upon comparative scholarship to address.
This essay will look at the discourse of individualism in the context of what I call translingual practice between East and West. I will focus on the ways in which this "Western" discourse was deployed by Chinese intellectuals in theories of the modern nation-state during the early decades of the twentieth century. My emphasis on the act of deployment is intended to shift the critique of the post-Enlightenment European concept of the subject to a site where meaning does not belong to European philosophical traditions alone (even though the concept itself might have "originated" there), but "travels" and gets reinvented in the constant flux of historical practices, not the least of which is the encounter between languages through translation and translingual practice. I hope that this line of inquiry will enable me to engage with the contemporary theoretical debate on the subject, difference, culture, and nation at the time when it is becoming increasingly difficult to conduct "cross-culture" studies or theorize about na-Lukics, Lucien Goldmann, and Raymond Williams, with Foucault thrown in toward the end, in order to measure the individual career of each critic against his historical background. For some inexplicable reason, however, his discussion does not go beyond the usual argument that theory is always a response to changing social and historical circumstance^.^ The traveling aspect of his theory is somehow abandoned in the course of his discussion.
As I tried to figure out a way to explain why Said's notion of traveling theory got sidetracked so easily and failed to deliver that which it had promised, it occurred to me that perhaps the notion itself lacked the kind of intellectual rigor needed for its own fulfillment. Indeed, who does the traveling? Does theory travel? If so, how? Granted that theory does possess such subjectivity, a further question entails: what is the means of transportation? Is it the aircraft, automobile, rickshaw, train, man-of-war, or space shuttle? Commenting on Said's oversight, James Clifford suggests that "Lukicsian Marxism in his essay seems to travel by immigrant boat; theory nowadays takes the plane, sometimes with round-trip ticket^."^ But I would like to take this point a step further, for not only does the concept of traveling theory tend to affirm the primacy of theory (or Western theory in the context of Said's book) by endowing the latter with full-fledged, mobile subjectivity, but it omits to account for the vehicle of translation. With the suppression of that vehicle, travel becomes such an abstract idea that it makes no difference whatsoever in which direction theory travels (from West to East or the other way around) and for what purpose (cultural exchange, imperialism, or colonization), or in which language and for what audience one translates in the first place! In light of the fact that language transaction has always been a contested territory in national and international struggles, its neglect by Said in his formulation of traveling theory is rather peculiar and, shall I say, conducive to the widely held view of theory (read Western theory) as if it were the incarnation of a hero from a European picaresque narrative who initiates the trip, encounters obstacles en route, and always ends up being accommodated one way or the other in the host country. This configuration is extremely problematic to me, because it privileges theory while erasing the agency of translation or glossing it over as a necessary but insignificant medium. Until recently, translation did not present itself as a theoretical problem or even a meaningful historical practice worthy of postcolonial scholarship, although it has been known for a long time that the translator or some other agent in the target language usually initiates the linguistic transaction by taking, selecting, combining, and reorganizing words, categories, and discourses from the source language and reinventing them in the target language, and that the needs of the translator and hisher audience together determine and negotiate the meaning (that is, usefulness) of any theory taken from the source language.
Tejaswini Niranjana's book, Siting Tmnshtion: Histoq Post-Structuralism, and the Colonial Context, is probably one of the few attempts to place the problem of translation at the heart of colonial history. Writing about the experience of colonial India, the author sees translation as "part of the colonial discourse of Orientalism" and "British efforts to obtain information about the people ruled by the merchants of the East India C~m p a n y . "~ To the extent that the author points to translation as an important site of colonial control, she offers a most powerful critique, indeed; but to the extent that her discussion privileges European languages as target languages in these linguistic transactions and in her own research (three of her chapters are devoted to discussing Paul de Man, Walter Benjamin, and Derrida), the book leaves the other side of the story untold: what happens when a European language gets translated into a non-European language? Can the power relationship between East and West be reinvented in that case? If so, how?
In raising those questions, however, I must take care not to endorse new constructs of binary opposition in place of the old ones, no matter whether they take the form of Western theory versus Chinese reality or the more sophisticated one of oppositional discourse. In the case of the former, the theory/reality divide reintroduces the old binary of theory and practice, and thus compounds the historical burden that one is supposed to unpack.8
Perhaps, a more meaningful question to ask in this kind of investigation is what type of relationship exists historically between Western theory and Chinese theory rather than, say, whether Western theory is relevant or irrelevant to Chinese reality. O n the other hand, the concept of oppositional discourse that prevails in contemporary scholarship on postcoloniality creates a different set of problems, although this idea is far more interesting than the theorylreality opposition mentioned above. My difficulty with the idea of oppositional discourse is that it tends to reduce the complexities surrounding the power relationship between East and West to that of Western domination versus native resi~tance.~ There is a certain amount of danger in reifying the patterns of resistance and domination along the East/West divide, since the boundaries between the two are frequently permeable and subject to changing conditions. In my study of translingual practice, therefore, a non-European language does not automatically constitute a site of resistance to European languages. Rather, I see it as a muchneglected area where complex processes of domination and resistance can be observed and interpreted from within the discursive context of that language as well as in connection with other linguistic environments.
I am proposing the notion of translingual practice in order to ground my study of an earlier moment of historical transaction between China and the West in language practices. Since the modern intellectual tradition in China began with translation, adaptation, appropriation, and other interlingual practices in relation to the West, it is inevitable that this inquiry should take translation as its point of departure. Yan Fu's interpretative translation of Huxley's Euolution and Ethics (1898) made an enormous impact on China and helped fashion a whole generation of Chinese intelligentsia in his time. In literature, Lin Shu became immensely popular for having rendered over a hundred foreign works into literary Chinese, and his work predated the publication of Lu Xun's first modern short story (1918) by many years." However, I must hasten to add that the focus of my study of translingual practice is not translation in a technical sense, but the condition of translation and discursive practices that ensue from initial interlingual contacts between languages. Broadly defined, I will be looking at the process through which new words, meanings, and discourses arise, circulate, and acquire legitimacy within the target language due to, or in spite of, the latter's contactlcollision with the source language. Meanings, therefore, are not so much "transformed" when concepts pass from the source language into the target language as (re)invented within the local environment of the latter. In that sense, translation is no longer a neutral event untouched by the contending interests of political and ideological struggles. Instead, it becomes the very site of such struggles where the source language is forced to encounter the target language, where the irre-ducible differences between them are fought out, authorities evoked or challenged, ambiguities dissolved or created, and so forth, until new words and meanings emerge in the target language itself. I hope the notion of translingual practice will eventually lead to a vocabulary that helps to account for the process of adaptation, translation, introduction, and domestication of words, categories, and discourses from one language to another and, furthermore, to explain the modes of transmission, manipulation, deployment, and domination within the power structure of the target language." open to question because they ignore the fact that the trope of equivalence between the English word "self" and the Chinese j i or other such words has been established only recently in the process of translation and fixed by means of modern bilingual dictionaries." Thus, any linkages that exist between the two derive from historical coincidences whose meanings are contingent on the politics of translingual practice. Once such linkages are established, a text becomes "translatable" in the ordinary sense of the word.
However, problems arise immediately -and I cannot stress this point enough-when a comparative theory between languages allows itself to be built upon the basis of an essential category, such as that of "self:' whose linguistic identity somehow transcends the history of translation. To give an example, I would like to mention Tu Wei-ming's work on Chinese philosophy in English, as he is the foremost theorist in the U.S. to expound on the differences between the Neo-Confucianjz and the Western notion of the self. Tu Wei-ming's humanist notion ofji is predicated on the idea that the former can be readily translated into the English word "self" without the mediation of the modern history of translation. In a number of his works, such as Humanity and Self-cultivation: Essays in Confucian Thought and Confucian Thought: Selfhood as Creative Transformation, his argument appears tautological: the Neo-Confucian ji differs from (by which he means is superior to) the Western notion of the self, but it remains a notion of the elf."'^ In other words, difference comes to be conceived only at the level of ontological makeup but not that of the constitutive category where the question of linguistic transaction must be brought in. The assumed homogeneity betweenji and "self" inevitably blots out the history of each word as well as the history of translation of "self" and related words in modern Chinese. His knowledgeable study of Neo-Confucianism notwithstanding, Tu Weiming's comparative approach has the disadvantage of circumventing the question of analytical categories by assuming transparency in translation.
In order to open up the equivalence of meanings across different languages that bilingual dictionaries guard so jealously, it is necessary to interrogate the dynamic history of words and related concepts, categories, and discourse beyond the realm of common sense or dictionary definition. For example, it is one thing to know that the English word "self" can be translated as xiwo, wo, ji, and so on, but a different thing to realize that each of these translations commands a discursive field that carries its own history. In modern Chinese, xiwo is probably a neologism imported from Meiji Japan, where a huge number of Chinese characters had been used to translate concepts from European 1ang~ages.l~ The rest of the translations of "self" are appropriated from classical Chinese philosophy, NeoConfucianism in particular, although with a radical and important shift in meaning. To complicate the situation further, there is also a family of words geren, gewei, geti in modern Chinese-translations of the English word "individual"-that are sometimes used interchangeably with the family of x i~o . '~ Thus, the slippage of xiwo, wo, geren, gewei, geti, and jz not only inherits the slippage of meaning between "self" and "individual" in the English original but reflects the complex scenario of translingual practices and its politics in the Chinese context. Indeed, the notions of xiwo, wo, geren, gewei, geti, ji, and so on have come down to us as part of the rich legacies of modern Chinese history.I6 How do we understand and explain this situation? What kind of knowledge does it bring to light besides a popularized image of Westernization, iconoclasm, and antitraditionalism? Is it possible to pose it as a theoretical prob-lem in the context of Chinese modernity rather than foreclose it as an established fact or one of those timeless motifs?
The inaugural issue of the journal Xin chao (The renaissance or New tide), published by students of Beijing University at the peak of the New Culture Movement, carries a polemical piece by Chen Jia'ai, entitled "Xin" (The new). This article spells out the rhetoric of modernity in a series of tropes. "The new is singular and the old is plural:' says the author; "The former is singular for being absolutely unique whereas the latter is plural for being open to infinite m~ltiplication."'~ Armed with the figure of inflective grammar, the author then proceeds to elaborate his point about old and new using the metaphor of genealogy: "It takes two, man and wife, to make a single son at a time (even twins come one after the other). Conversely, parents that give birth to the son were in turn brought into the world by the grandparents, who owed their lives to the great-grandparents ad injnitum" (ibid) . Far from being a treatise preaching filial piety, the essay is trying to make the point that "old" ideas, like the older generation, are bound to be replaced by "new" ones, which the author defines in the rest of the essay as singular, unique, modern, and therefore superior.
In the context of the New Culture Movement, the loaded terms of old and new set up a binary opposition between tradition and modernity, which typically intersects with the cultural antinomy of East and West that assigns superiority to the latter. This unique intersection characterizes the historical experience of modernity in China as distinct from that of the West, which also had its share of the Querelle des anciens et des modernes. While Europe sought the expansion of its territory in the name of progress, China had to endure the violence of imperialism in order to come to terms with "modernity" (read "the West").'* As can be seen, such violence is internalized by the author of the essay above, whose argument for the new and the unique is couched, not surprisingly, in the trope of Indo-European grammatical number: danshu (the singular) versus zhongshu (the plural), not available in the Chinese language. Inasmuch as the figure of speech in this passage draws on the resources of the inflective Indo-European language, the allegorical thrust of the text may, therefore, be read as privileging the categories of the modern, Western, and individual (symbolized by the son), as opposed to those of the traditional, Chinese, and familial (represented by the older generation). Such rhetoric turns into a driving force behind most of the radical discourses of selfhood, nationhood, and modernity in the May Fourth era.
Since the inflected grammar of the modern self is embedded from the first moment in a history of contested meanings within which the idea of nationhood looms large, it is difficult, if not impossible, to treat the self as an isolated site of unique personal identity. The sources of this difficulty, as I see it, lie not so much in the ontological, psychoanalytical (such as the Lacanian theory), or linguistic considerations that usually enable our academic deconstruction of the unitary subject, or in the so-called unbroken tradition of holism in Chinese culture, as in the particular kind of history that China and the Chinese were forced to go through since the midnineteenth century. In other words, the violence of China's encounter with the West forces nationhood upon selfhood, and vice versa, under those unique circumstances. Yet the modern self is never quite reducible to national identity. On the contrary, it is the incongruities, tensions, and struggles between the two as well as their mutual implication and complicity that give full meaning to the lived experience of Chinese modernity.
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Geren zhuyi (individualism) happened to be one of those concepts that held out great promise to help resolve the problematic of modern selfhood and nationhood, but, as I will demonstrate below, it turned out to complicate the whole situation instead. This neologism, like many others, had been invented earlier by Meiji intellectuals in Japan to translate Western liberal and nationalist theories of "individualism" (kojin shugi). Having been introduced into China at the turn of the century, it soon grew to be a chief signpost on the discursive terrain of the self in modern China. In order to tease out the meaning of individualism in the Chinese context, let me begin by making a brief comparison between two antithetical views about individualism and its relevance to China. The first view is expressed in an article titled "Gewei zhuyi" (Individualism) that was published in Dondang zazhi (The Eastern miscellany) in 1916. Jia Yi, who signed this essay, says: "Individualism is utterly alien to the Chinese mind. Inasmuch as the clan, local district, state, and society hold absolute dominance, there is no chance for the individual to emerge."" A contrary view will be found in Bertrand Russell's The Problem of China (1922), where the author states that "Individualism has perished in the West, but in China it survives, for good as well as for evil."" Both authors seem to subscribe to a notion of individualism that predicates a core of fixed values, yet their views are mediated by a profound sense of crisis about the state of their nations, that is, Jia Yi's poverty-stricken China and Russell's post-World War I Europe, and by a desire for the other (although on both sides that desire seems embedded a priori in the economy of Western Enlightenment ideology). The contrast provided by their individual positions has major methodological implications for me, because it renders any potential quest for an essential and fixed meaning of the individual and individualism futile and misguided. What really matters here is the discursive practice surrounding the notion of individual, self, individualism, and so on as well as the politics of such practice.
T h e above-mentioned point, however, is not as self-evident as it appears. O n the contrary, much of the existing historiography on the theme of Chinese enlightenment in the New Culture Movement treats the concept of individualism as a given value. Li Zehou and Vera Schwarcz, for instance, hold May Fourth nationalism chiefly responsible for bringing the New Culture Movement to an untimely end and consequently jeopardizing the project of enlightenment of which individualism formed an integral part." Both scholars seem to take the grand narrative of the European Enlightenment as a fixed, unproblematic site of meaning against which the Chinese enlightenment is to be measured for its degrees of success (or failure) instead of investigating the latter as part of a dynamic historical process capable of generating its own meanings and terms of interpretation. In so doing, they end up reading history according to a set of master codes, while eliding the subtleties, complexities, and contingencies of given meanings and situations that emerged from the twists and turns of events.'* Among mainland Chinese scholars currently engaged in revisionary historiography, there is a general tendency to dub the May Fourth conception of the individual "inauthentic" on the ground of its incommensurabil-ity with the original notion from the West. According to that view, Li
Zehou was wrong to grant to the New Culturalists a role-short-lived as it was-in the dissemination of the idea of individual freedom. Supporters of this view argue that the tragedy of Chinese intellectuals in this century is that they tend to place the highest premium on society, nation, people, and the state but never on the individual, and that "it is absurd to believe that the 'May Fourth' conception of the 'liberation of individuality' came anywhere close to sending the true message of 'individual freedom.' "23 While I agree that the May Fourth notion of the individual is always tied up with those of the nation, state, and society, I find it difficult to take the idea that the "original" Western notion of the individual is exempted from those external considerations, nor do I see the Chinese notion as simply a distorted image of the Western idea. Anthony J. Cascardi points out in his book, The Subject of Modernity, that the Enlightenment notion of subjectivity in the West is part of the legitimation question in the theory of modernity and that "the culture of modernity is given shape as a divided whole that can only be unified through the powers of an abstract subject, or its political analogue, the autonomous State. Indeed, it can be said that the State gains power and scope precisely insofar as it provides a means through which the divided subjects of modernity can be made whole."24 In light of Cascardi's analysis of the political theory of Hobbes, Hegel, Heidegger, Weber, and others in that book, one can hardly maintain an essentialist and ahistorical understanding of the individual without upholding a myth of the West. That being the case, the critique of the Chinese concept of the individual as inauthentic is but a recuperation of the reductive rhetoric of Chinese collectivism versus Western individualism and, therefore, fails to provide a historical explanation as to why the Western notion of the individual or individualism, authentic or otherwise, had been introduced into China in the first place.
In one of his early essays, "Wenhua pianzhi lun" (On misorientation of culture) (1907), Lu Xun offers an explanation that at least situates the problem of the individual and individualism in the context of the Late Qing reform:
In less than three or four years after the word geren [individual] was introduced into China, progressive intellectuals began to shun the idea positions 1 :1 Spring 1993 1 72 like leprosy. Whoever had the misfortune of having the label of the individual tagged to his person, he would be regarded as a scoundrel, for it is commonly believed that individualism privileges self-centeredness at the expense of others. The reason that such a misunderstanding is able to thrive is that nobody has ever bothered to look into the true meaning of the word. However, as soon as we investigate the idea in its historical setting, the truth will come to light.25
To redeem the authentic meaning of the individual and individualism, Lu
Xun draws on diverse European intellectual traditions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Rousseau, Kierkegaard, Hegel, Schopenhauer, and Henrik Ibsen are invoked as the voices of dignified individuals, whereas frictions or incongruities that exist amongst those thinkers pass otherwise unnoticed. Such treatment of post-Enlightenment European thought is no doubt extremely reductive, but its reductionism demands a historical explanation. In the context of this essay and elsewhere, such as in "Moho shili shuo" (The power of Mara poetry) (1907), Lu Xun's rhetoric of (in)authenticity with regard to individualism is deployed for the purpose of criticizing the constitutionists for their worship of wealth and military power. In so doing, he challenges their hold on intellectual authority on its own ground (that is, knowledge of the West). Individualism is seized upon as a potential antidote to what he sees as the vice of rampant materialism of his time. For example, he argues that Western civilization has been consistently misrepresented by those Chinese who pursue power, fame, and wealth in the name of progress. In his opinion, the true spirit of the West lies beneath the surface of its nineteenth-century materialism, its essence being the noble ideals of the French Revolution like egalitarianism, freedom, and political rights of the individual. To capture that spirit, one must say "no to materialism" and "yes to the individual" (ibid., p. 185). This view of the individual is interesting less because it anticipates the New Culture Movement by many years than because it provides a contextual basis for the study of the discourse of individualism and, particularly, its subsequent metamorphoses.
In a study of the intellectual legacy of Meiji Japan, to which theorists of Chinese modernity including Lu Xun were heavily indebted, Andrew E.
Barshay points out that it is important to grasp the meaning of individual and individualism with utmost attentiveness to the rise of modern Japanese nationhood. "We cannot treat individual and state as mutually opposed:' he argues; "We are not dealing with alienated personalities:' Barshay 's discussion of Uchimura and the latter's influence on Nanbara Shigeru demonstrates that even in the case of spiritual quest "religion did not form an 'exit option' from earthly -read national and organizational-duties. The nation was to be the object of religious action transmuted into expertise."26
In contrast to Lu Xun above, Nanbara as homo religiosus holds the view that the root of all error, and the cause of all discord and misery in early modern Japan, lies in the "selfishness" of the modern man. Reinterpreting Uchimura, he asserts: "By what sign do we identify this 'modern man' who lurks among us? It is his 'self' bike], a self sometimes hidden . . . from God Himself. Not 'the Other,' not 'the Absolute: but the egoistic 'individual' lies at the core of this self. In his self modern man seeks after God. And he proposes to do this by means of 'knowledge' [chishiki] . (How long I myself, modern man that I am, clung to this egoistic self!)"*' Andrew E.
Barshay explains in an illuminating commentary that "It was in fact the modern condition-and Japan was modern-that Uchimura, in Nanabara's conception, sought to transform'' (ibid.).
Indeed, the historical contingency of meanings requires that the notion of the individual be studied as a historical category rather than be assumed to be a superior, transcendental value. So, instead of taking up a position to valorize the ideology of individualism on behalf of a localized narrative of progress, my study will try to situate the claims of individualism, such as postulated by the theory of Chinese modernity, within their specific historical contexts and subject them to critical examination. My argument is that, contrary to that which is commonly believed, the discourse of individualism stood in a rather ambivalent relation to the master narrative of the nation-state in the early republican period. Like all other prevalent discourses of the time, it invested in the major process of power reconfiguration in ways that defy simplistic closure (that is, authentic versus inauthentic individualism). As my analysis will show, individualism does not always constitute itself as the counterdiscourse of nationalism nor does enlightenment see itself as the other of national salvation. Tensions between the two discourses seem to derive from the instability of their historical meanings just as much as from their mutual implication and complicity.
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In this section, I will focus on some of the most interesting debates on individualism in the early republican period as they appeared in the fol- In this essay, the author points out that the types of social reform implemented in the past few decades have focused exclusively on macro-level politics, educational system, and business economy, whereas proper attention should have been devoted to the reform of germ or the individual (a subtle displacement of Liang Qichao's xinmin or new citizen). As a result, even though the new republic replaced the old imperial order, the reform has not fundamentally changed the old bureaucracy, which continues to do business as usual and, moreover, turns reformers themselves into bureaucrats, who now go by the name of civil servants of the republic. Genuine reform, he emphasizes, must originate at the level of the individual, including those self-appointed reformers. Until the individual begins to face the reality of "his own frail and unhealthy body, his impotent and weak spirit, his shallow and incapable mind, and his disordered and purposeless life, social reform will be no more than a remote dream.''31 The mere fact that Du
Yaquan stresses the centrality of the individual in the reform program does not imply that he endorses the Enlightenment notion of individualism. O n the contrary, it is the limits of the individual that he sees and addresses here.
It is worth noting that the concept of individualism had not yet acquired the kind of ideological and emotional baggage that it would accumulate a few years later when the New Culture Movement got under way. For Du Yaquan, the meaning of individualism is ambivalent and needs redefinition: "We are not individualists:' he says, "but socialism must be imagined on the basis of individualism. Confucius means precisely that when he says that a scholar should study for self-improvement; so does Mencius when he adjures us to cultivate our inner being" (ibid., p. 3). What strikes me most about Du's use of individualism is that he sees it as fully compatible with socialism and Confucianism. To me, that brings out two points. First, the concept of individualism is undergoing a semantic conversion that aims to redeem it from the negative image in which it has been cast by Liang Qichao's theory of the nation-state. In Xinmin shuo (The new citizen) and Zzyou shu (On liberty), for example, Liang Qichao had allowed the nationstate to take absolute precedence over the individual and tried to maintain a careful distinction between the liberty of a people and individual freedom while opposing the former to the latter.32 What Du Yaquan attempts to do in this essay is to reconcile the two. Secondly, individualism had not become radicalized at this particular juncture of history either as the polar opposite of Confucianism or as the other of socialism. T h e first of such polarizations, as I will explain later, occurred around the New Culture Movement (1917) and went on through the May Fourth Movement, where individualism came to invest heavily in the political indictment against traditional Chinese culture. The next wave of polarization set in during the Communist revolution in the mid-and late twenties, when individualism had acquired the negative status of bourgeois ideology and was opposed to socialism. In Du Yaquan's view, however, individualism is but a modern version of Confucianism that emphasizes the need for self-reform and at the same time articulates a version of socialism that predicates the interest of the average members of society. This peculiar (re)interpretation of Confucianism, socialism, and individualism helps throw light on the reform agenda of Du's own time. Since his text and context were thoroughly embedded in the historical circumstances under which he wrote, it is beside the point to argue whether his particular interpretation of any of these ideas is authentic or not. Insofar as the condition and production of knowledge are concerned, interpretations and misinterpretations (if there are any such things) both obtain and participate in the making of real historical events. As Edward Said points out, calling one work a misreading of another's or relating that misreading to a general theory of interpretation as misinterpretation is "to pay no critical attention to history and to ~ituation."~~ The question that interests me, therefore, is why the author interprets the way he does and what new meanings are produced in this process. Du Yaquan's article is probably one of the first journalistic attempts to bring germ (individual) into public discussion after the founding of the new republic. But the essay does not go beyond constituting the individual as a privileged site of reform, wherein lies his affinity with Liang Qichao. In Min Zhi's article, "Wo" (I or Self), which appeared in the same journal in 1916, the individual begins to evolve into something of an absolute value.
The author preaches self-reliance with an acute modern historical consciousness, although much of what he says is couched in the language of ancient Chinese phil0sophy.3~ Min Zhi situates his argument in the total bankruptcy of the ancient world, pointing out that, at a time when the country disintegrates and poverty, unrest, and catastrophe reign everywhere, the individual is left with no resources. Whereas in the old imperial age a man would take consolation in the thought that he could read the sorrows of the people and bring them to the attention of the emperor, nowadays one can do absolutely nothing. Under these circumstances, the best thing one could do is to fall back on one's own self. Self-reliance thus becomes a necessary means of survival in the modern world. In order to justify his claim that the self is the raison d'ttre of existence, Min Zhi draws a distinction between siwo (private self) and gongwo (public self) and elaborates the dialectic of the two on the basis of a worn metaphor. Just as a candle illuminates every corner of the room when it gives out light, he argues, so the pursuit of self-interest will also benefit others. Gongwo and siwo are thus interconnected and mutually reinforced, except that the former is set apart from the latter by a sense of moral commitment in its relentless crusade for individual quanli (rights). But when he claims that gongwo (the public self) "must fight those who block its way until the desired objective is achieved" and thrive in jingzheng (competition), this public self sounds more like a social Darwinist than a beneficial candle light (ibid., p. 1 6 ) .~~
The next issue of The Emtm Mrjcellany (1916) carried the article "Gewei zhuyi" (Individualism) by the author Jia Yi whom I mentioned earlier, who openly championed a Western Enlightenment notion of the indiviIndividualism, he argues, is the single most effective medicine to cure China's illness, the root of which lies in her weakness for totalistic thinking. The modern world abhors Zongtong (totality), and everything under the sun must be subjected to the scientific law of specification, division, and subdivision. To him, the master trope of modernity isfen (to divide, separate, classify, differentiate): "What is modern civilization? By way of illustration, there are branches in science, division of labor in society, liberated individuals, independent personalities, and whatnot" (ibid., p. 7). The case of individualism is borne out, moreover, by established modern disciplines such as psychology, sociology, and ethics, all of which are designed, in his view, to assist in "the development of the individual" and his "self-realization" (ibid., p. 8). The modern individual is now opposed to social collectives. State, society, community, and family are all supposed to provide for the individual and not to hinder his or her growth. This kind of oppositional rhetoric would soon help unleash a tremendous amount of political energy during the New Culture Movement and the May Fourth period. But the paradox is that, throughout the essay, the author himself remains oblivious to his own totalistic impulse in prescribing individualism as the cure for China's illness.
In the next year, Du Yaquan brought out a new article titled "Geren yu guojia zhi jieshuo" (The boundary between the individual and the state), in The Eastern Miscellany, where he set out to specify the relationship between the individual and the state.37 Du insists that the line between the individual and the state be scrupulously drawn so that neither will encroach upon the rights or interests of the other. The oppositional rhetoric that we noted in Jia Yi's article is now expressed in an unequivocally conflictual framework. "It is commonly believed that the state represents totality whereas the individual belongs to this totality as a member, who may thus be submerged in the totality."38 The author then proceeds to criticize such subordination of the individual to the state. In fact, throughout the article one senses a good deal of anxiety about the increasing hold of the state and nationalist discourse on the individual. "Who represents the state?" he asks; "Perhaps it is just a handful of administrators who decide to sacrifice the interest of the majority to their own will" (ibid., p. 4). In a less cynical moment, he points out that the architecture of the state is founded on the building blocks of the individual. Without due respect for the integrity of the latter, there cannot be reliable support for the former. All this dialectic and metaphoric language notwithstanding, what strikes me as extraordinary as I follow the author's argument closely is the implication that modernity is quite capable of placing the average individual in unmediated relation to the nation-state. The author of this essay may well criticize the hegemony of the state on behalf of the individual, but his critique cannot disrupt the statehndividual continuum of which he gives such a lucid account. The very act of elaborating a dialectic between the two is to reproduce that continuum. In order for the nation-state to claim the individual in some "unmediated" fashion, the individual must be "liberated" in the first place from the family, clan, or other traditional ties that claim hisher loyalty. The discourse of individualism performed precisely that liberatory role in the early history of modern China. As Tse-tsung Chow points out in a slightly different context, "While the disintegration of the old ethics probably emancipated the individual somewhat from the bond with his family and clan, it also cleared the way for placing the individual in bondage to state, party, or other social and economic organization^."^^ I would also argue that the discourse of individualism has probably accomplished something more than liberating the individual from family to state. It has contributed to the process of inventinggeren for the goals of liberation and national revolution. In that sense, despite its apparent clash with the nation-state, the discourse of individualism finds itself in complicity with nationalism. Being a discursive formation of modernity, the unmediated continuum of the individual and the nation-state seeks to contain the conflicts it generates, which explains why the critique of the state's subordination of the individual can be so readily recuperated by the object of that critique. Gao Yihan's 1915 essay "Guojia fei rensheng zhi guisu lun" (The state is not the ultimate goal of human life), in Youth Magazine (later New Youth), criticizes the modern state in a similar view, but he also introduces the notion of renmin (the people), an aggregate of individuals, and treats it as a potential opposite of the state. Like most journalistic writings of the time, this essay contains numerous references to Western philosophy and political science, sometimes via the work of Japanese scholars. Since the enlightenment theory of the nation-state dictates the terms of his critique, the author remains blind to the fact that renmin (the people) is just as much a product of the modern nation-state as the individual. What I find most peculiar about his argument, however, is not so much the concept of renmin as his translation of the individual as xiaoji-a word appropriated from ancient Chinese philosophy -instead of the usual word geren. Xiaoji evokes daji (greater self), which serves as a trope for guojia (nation-state) and occasionally for shehui (society):'
The author elucidates the relationship of xiauji and the state in the words of a Japanese scholar as follows: " 'The develop-ment of xiaoji [individual] is the concern of the state. Without the proper development of the individual there can be no proper development of the state"' (ibid., p. 7). This is reminiscent of the earlier dialectic that we have examined above, but here I also see a subtle slippage of meanings and categories. The word xiao opens the thinking of the individual to the metaphoric realm of substitution, displacement, and analogy in which the word da reigns. In other words, xiao is related to da not only as its antithetical other but as its hierarchical other, or the lesser of the two. T h e implication of this linguistic mechanism for our understanding of the problematic of the individual versus the state is manifold, particularly in light of the fact that publications in New Youth during this period were chiefly responsible for disseminating the modern idea of xiaoji and daji.4' Inasmuch as the individual is named xiao and the state da, the critique of the state on behalf of the individual cannot transcend the hierarchical order of a language that names and determines such a relationship. Furthermore, as the concept of the greater self seems to project full-fledged subjectivity onto the state, it displaces the individual as agency and a site of power on the discursive level. Indeed, never has the individual been so inextricably tied u p with the nation-state and so ineluctably claimed by it as when xiaoji and dajz began their dialectic career. of individualism (as a privileged signifier of the West) and Confucianism (as the equivalent of Chinese tradition) that would prevail subsequently in the discourse of the New Culture Movement is already anticipated in this of son on father, and of wife on husband: "Like slaves and beasts of burden, these tragic creatures could not aspire to self-autonomy, to say nothing of self-development. The true law of the universe is weiwo [egoism] and it must be maintained at all He then cites science, sociology, psychology, and nineteenth-century European ethics in support of his theory of selfaggrandizement. But if the author's argument is to be taken seriously at all, it is not difficult for us to see that his rhetoric derives its power from contradictory sources. Individualism is perceived not only as thoroughly homogeneous with nationalism but anticipating and nurturing it. This observation is not intended as a critique of the author's lack of sophistication, although that is certainly true if we compare him with Gao Yihan, but serves as a reminder that the discourse of individualism, which never had a stable center of meanings, was going through a dramatic process of transformation around the New Culture Movement, out of which new configurations of power would emerge.
It replace the ancient classical can0n.4~ Likewise, in Zhou Zuoren's influential essay, "Ren de wenxue" (Literature for humans), the author argues that modern literature must take humanism as its guiding principle, and by humanism he means "subject-centered germ xhuyi [indi~idualism] ."~~ The subtext of Zhou's argument is that classical Chinese literature fails to live up to humanistic goals and therefore must be discarded. Indeed, if one were to summarize the remarkable role played by the New Culture Movement in modern history, one might say that this movement successfully constituted Chinese tradition and its classics as the other of individualism and humanism, whereas the nation-state, which used to occupy that antithetical position, was now largely taken for granted.
The discussion of individualism during the New Culture Movement was by no means confined to theoretical debates, as such consideration lay at the very heart of literary reform. A significant event took place in the stylistics of fiction when May Fourth writers began to translate and introduce modes of psychonarration, free indirect style, lengthy interior monologue, and other narrative strategies from European fiction into their own works. The impact of this stylistic change has yet to be fully grasped in thorough and detailed readings of individual texts and in light of comparative stylistics. As a suggestion, let me just point out that the new stylistics of fiction seems to allow Chinese writers to locate the protagonist in a new symbolic context, one in which the protagonist no longer serves as a mere element within the nexus of patriarchal kinships and/or in a transcendental, divine scheme as in most premodern Chinese fiction, but dominates the text, instead, as the locus of meaning and reality in possession of psychological and moral "truth.?' Not surprisingly, the May Fourth period was also a time when huge quantities of first-person fiction and autobiography written in a "Western" form appeared>6 The modern autobiographical subject -one that takes itself seriously, asserts its autonomy against traditional society, and possesses an interiority representable in narrative-made its entry into Chinese literature exactly at the time when the individual and tradition were constructed as polar opposite^.^' To modern writers, this individual self can be immensely empowering, because it enables h i d h e r to devise a dialogic language with which to attack the status quo, as L u Xun does in "The Diary of a Madman." But it can also be problematic because the individual often turns out to be a misfit in the hostile environment of a rapidly disintegrating society. T h e Russian "superfluous man:' who figures so prominently in Yu Dafu's works, thus becomes a perfect embodiment of the typical dilemma of modernity.
Yet, to conclude that subjectivism and individualism characterize May Fourth literature is to miss the point here. What I am trying to suggest is that the discourse of individualism enabled May Fourth intellectuals to open up a new battlefront in their struggle to claim modernity. It is not as if the individual were valorized at the expense of society or nation. Even as Chinese tradition fell under attack, nationalism and social collectivism were never abandoned. On the contrary, the latter now inhabited the same homogeneous space of modernity as individualism. One need only recall Yu Dafu's protagonist in "Chen lun" (Sinking), where the crisis of modernity is experienced as one of selfhood, manhood, and nationhood simultaneously. Hu Shi's 1919 essay "Bu xiu" (Immortality), in New Youth, bears further witness to the May Fourth conception of the individual, nation, and society.
In it H u Shi names the individual "I" as xiaowo, whose extension or multiplication in society is called dawo (greater self).48 Xiaowo is mortal and incomplete as opposed to dawo, which is immortal and capable of renewing itself. H u Shi's dialectic of the two selves echoes that of Gao Yihan's xiaoji and daji, except that in the anti-imperialist context of the May Fourth Movement the nation-state is no longer perceived as antithetical to the individual, so dawo here stands for modern organic society, with which the individual must come to terms under the aegis of the nation-state. It should be pointed out, however, that H u Shi's subordination of xzaowo (individual) to dawo (society) does not indicate regression from individualism and enlightenment on the part of the New Culturalists. I see his position as a logical expression of the theory of modernity which does not seek to liberate individuals so much as to constitute them as citizens of the nation-state and members of a modern society.
It is no surprise that the first essay in the initial issue of The Renaissance (1919) is devoted to the question of the place of the individual in modern society. Fu Sinian, the author of this article, begins by establishing the superiority of Western scientific and humanist knowledge against several indigenous intellectual traditions-Taoism, Buddhism, Confucianism -none of which, according to him, embodies the truth of human life. In his opinion, one must look for the truth in biology, psychology, sociology, and so forth, because modern scientific knowledge is subject-centered and humanistic. Finally, Fu brings out his favorite slogan in both Chinese and English: "The free development of the individuals for the Common Welfare."49 In an attached footnote, he confesses that the Chinese language is inimical to his modern way of thinking, so he is compelled to use English. This sounds almost like a burlesque of language reform to a postMay Fourth ear. If the author were to follow this logic all the way through, positions 1 :l Spring 1993 would he perhaps end up finding the free development of the individual inimical to the common welfare of the nation as well? This is precisely the point at which leftist and Marxist intellectuals would enter and stake their claims in the aftermath of the May Fourth Movement.
F u Sinian's liberal-humanist ideal was soon displaced by a leftist ideology that cast grave doubts on individualism and capitalized on the conflictual relationship between individual and society. In 1921, The Renaissance published an article titled "Wu he wo" (Matter and self) by Wang Xinggong, who tried to bring the autonomy of the individual into question. T h e author begins by rejecting the notions of "physical self" and "spiritual self?' maintaining that this autonomous "I" we call self does not really exist: "If the self at the age of twenty were to encounter the self at the age of forty on the street, they would probably not recognize each other. Nor would any one else imagine that they were one and the same person. If the identity of the 'I' changes constantly as time goes on and is utterly heterogeneous with itself, can we still maintain that it is a fixed, permanent, and unchanging es~ence?"~' T h e upshot of his argument is that self is a form of experience, forever changing and forever adapting, whose meaning is solely determined by the material world. Therefore, to emphasize the importance of the individual is to misplace one's priority. It is interesting that the author uses Confucianism as a scapegoat for misplaced priorities. In his view, the idea of self-cultivation in Confucianism means placing exclusive emphasis on the improvement of the individual, with the implication that perfect personality would bring about a perfect society. H e dismisses that idea as sheer illusion. In his opinion, no fundamental change in society will occur until the sociopolitical system is tackled. Therefore, the question of society must take absolute precedence over that of the individual. Now, it is not for me to decide which social theory is more desirable for China-Confucianism or socialism-because I am interested only in the ways in which the terms of the debate are set or the uses to which either of these theories is put. In other words, to interpret individualism in terms of Confucianism in the antitraditionalist context of the May Fourth period is to incriminate it and turn it into a negative idea. We have come full circle from D u Yaquan's reconciliation of the two terms, where the opposite effect was intended.
Chen Duxiu's criticism of individualism is even more illuminating in that respect. In "Xuwu de geren zhuyi ji ren ziran zhuyi" (Nihilistic the discourse of individualism but the reinvention of it so that the discourse could serve the desired political end in a changing historical context. One of the earliest sophisticated critiques of individualism as bourgeois ideology, in my view, was offered by Deng Feihuang, in his essay "Geren zhuyi de youlai jiqi yingxiang" (The origin and impact of individualism), which appeared in The Eastern Miscellany in 1 9 2 2 .~~ In this lengthy article, the author traces the development of individualism through the rise of the free market and capitalism in the West, and through the Industrial Revolution and the European Enlightenment. He concludes by saying that, as a bourgeois ideology, individualism is passe and should be replaced by socialism. This is, of course, a familiar Marxist critique that shows more respect for the historicity of individualism than Chen Duxiu's view, discussed above. But, as knowledge and power are inextricably linked together, it is not enough to grasp what a discourse says, and one must be attentive to what the discourse does as well. In the context of the national politics of the early twenties, the Marxist evolutionist view of history is used to open up a political future whereby new power configurations involving the Communist Party, the Nationalist Party, warlords, and imperialist powers begin to surface and engage in intense local struggles.53 By the same token, the critique of bourgeois individualism introduces a rhetoric of social collectivism that can be used to advance the politics of the left, much in the same way as did the earlier liberatory discourse of individualism that had first established the individual/state continuum.
The founding of the People's Republic in 1949 marked a major turning point in the deployment of the discourse of individualism that I have examined thus far. This is largely because discursive authority was now placed squarely in the hands of the state. Although much of the C C P rhetoric was inherited from the earlier leftist criticism of bourgeois ideology, the state successfully transformed the idea of individualism into a synecdoche standing for a negative West, while the discursive struggle surrounding this meaning began to play an important role in China's reinvention of the power relationship between East and West as well as that between the state and its intelligentsia. Ironically, the official anti-Western rhetoric works most effectively whenever it sends its opponents to rally around individualism in the predictable gesture of pro-Western defiance. What tends to be neglected, forgotten, or suppressed in these endless contentions for or against the West is precisely the history of the discourse of individualism within China itself, a history fraught with political exigencies in the nation-building process. As late as the rnid-~gtlos, there was a major controversy over Liu Zaifu's theory of subjectivity, which brought the century-long debate on individualism up to date. In many ways, that controversy carried some of the familiar overtones from the earlier debates on individualism, but it also took on a character of violence reminiscent of the Cultural Revolution.54
Yet, there is another type of violence that is not so acutely felt but all the more damaging, which is amnesia, a forgetting of the discursive history of the past; hence, the possible return of the nightmare.
Notes
This essay is taken from a chapter of my forthcoming book on translingual practice and literary modernity in China. An earlier draft was presented at the conference on "Self and categories, a different kind of problem arises from the scenario above. I am concerned that the strategic impulse of identity politics might sidestep the question of the self as a historical and analytical category, much less to problematize it in any sustained manner. Hence the impoverishment of our understanding of the whole problem on a theoretical level. To put it crudely, because the languages of Third World societies-including, of course, the societies that social anthropologists have traditionally studied-are "weaker" in relation to Western languages (and today, especially to English), they are more likely to submit to forcible transformation in the translation process than the other way around. By focusing on the complexity of the self-positioning of the theorist in the postcolonial context, this move helps revise Said's original conception of traveling theory. At the same time, however, traveling theory is here replaced by the postcolonial traveling theorist as the privileged subject in the multiple mediations of different locations. To the extent that the fuzzy notion of location helps cut a discursive space for postcolonial theory and the Third World "diaspora" in the First World, it might work very well, but it is not very clear to me exactly how the postcolonial theorist relates to the "Third World" except that s h e travels in and out of it and points out its difference from that of the "First World." David Scott's analysis of the postcolonial situation in "Locating the Anthropological Subject: Postcolonial Anthropologists in Other places" in the same issue, suggests that the direction in which the postcolonial travels matters just as must as the difference of locations as s h e leaves one place for another:
The postcolonial is now, in Derek Walcott's felicitously ironic phrase, a "fortunate traveller." However, even as we recognize this irreversible redistribution of the postcolonial map (one which Louise Bennett has so inimitably satirized in such poems as "Colonization in Reverse"), we should not lose sight of the fact that these movements are rather one way than the other. Colonial and postcolonial peoples werdare going west. Anthropologists And Native Informants?" Mary E. John points out that "The choice of the term itself is telling-not emigrant, but immigrant" (ibid., p. 57).
The linkages between the two phenomena can hardly escape one's notice. In this respect it is doubtful that the postcolonial condition differs that much from that of the old colonial era. But I will defer the subject of immigrant culture to the scholars of diaspora whose excellent work has attracted increased attention in this country, and concentrate instead on the subject of traveling theory between East and West. My question is this: what happens when theory that has been produced in one language gets translated into another? In it Zhang cites Lu Xun's much-quoted phrase of nalai zhuyi (grabism [sic] ) to justify the Chinese appropriation of Western ideas. Although I agree that the meaning of a theory is always determined by the uses it is put to, it is a nayve gesture to celebrate Lu Xun's "grabbism" as some kind of a happy solution to the traumatic relationship between East and West in modern history. Precisely because of that history, a reverse formulation of Chinese theory versus Western reality cannot even be conceived. In my view, it is more important to explain the historical condition that gave rise to Lu Xun's "grabbism" than simply endorse it or reinforce the hegemonic relationship between Western theory and reality elsewhere in the world. modern writers started out as translators, and many remained in that capacity throughout their individual careers. Lu Xun himself translated numerous Russian and Japanese works into Chinese. His very first book, as we know, was a translation series titled Yuwai xiaoshuo ji (Anthology of foreign fiction) (1909), a collaboration with his brother Zhou Zuoren during their student days in Japan. I t goes without saying that the rise of modern journalism in metropolitan centers such as Shanghai and Beijing played a crucial role in all this. Take Xiaoshuo yuebao (Short story magazine), for example. The importance of this journal is often grasped in terms of its contribution to modern fiction, although I find its role as a broker between Chinese and foreign literatures far more interesting and significant than anything else. Between its reorganization by the Literary Association in 1921 (vol. 12, no. I ) and its demise in January 1932, this monthly set up sections and numerous programs the majority of which had to do with the introduction of foreign literature, theory, and criticism. By comparison, the original works of fiction and poetry we now call modern literature took up only a fraction of the total space. Among the regular sections featured by the journal, there is the "I? cong" or translation series, "literature abroad:' and "criticism," which devote well over half of the essays to the discussion of foreign literature. I I A word about my own positioning in this essay. Working simultaneously with two languages, Chinese and English, I find myself occupying a shifting position: moving back and forth between these languages and learning to negotiate irreducible differences. The concept of translingual practice, therefore, applies to my personal situation as an analyst just as much as to the earlier historical encounter between China and the West that I will explore in this essay. 14 In Meiji Japan, neologisms such as jiga and kojin were used to translate "self" and "individual,'' respectively.
15 An earlier practice among modern Chinese writers was to have the original and the Chinese translation appear at the same time. For instance, the English word "individual" or "self" would follow the Chinese words germ or ziwo. 
